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 Abstract: For over four decades after independence in 1947, India’s industrialization took 
place under a regime with an extensive system of controls over private capital. It is 
commonly believed that during this period of dirigisme, established dominant business 
families successfully manipulated the system to block competition from new firms and thereby 
perpetuated their dominance. This paper presents evidence to show that this perception 
conceals as much as it reveals. The process of industrialization between independence and 
the onset of liberalization in 1991 is actually marked by a combination of continuity with 
important shifts in the composition of Indian big business. The paper provides a framework 
for understanding this combination by revisiting the understanding of how business rivalry 
under Indian dirigisme actually worked. This is done by placing it within the context of 
dynamic industrialization and structural change, which unfolded within the specific 
economic, social and political realities of India. The paper shows that continuity and change 
amongst the leading private business enterprises had common roots in this competitive 
context. 
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After achieving independence from Britain in 1947, the Indian state adopted a strategy of 
import-substituting industrialization and „planned‟ economic development. As a result, the 
state principally took on the role of guiding and directing economic activity. Apart from 
controlling inflows of products, capital, and technology, Indian dirigisme essentially 
partitioned economic activity between the private and public sectors. The public sector 
dominated role key industries and sectors that constituted the „commanding heights‟ of the 
economy. At the same time, the state attempted to direct private investment in accordance 
with planned priorities. An elaborate system of controls on private capital was created, the 
centrepiece of which was a system of industrial licensing. The private sector was allowed to 
dominate manufacturing activity, which consisted of both formal and informal components. 
The informal component was larger than the formal at independence, but its relative share 
was reduced to a little over a third by the end of the 1980s. It was the formal part which was 
subjected to regulation. Large business firms, organized occasionally as individual joint-stock 
companies but more often as multi-company business groups, dominated the formal sphere. 
Following a foreign exchange crisis in 1991, economic policy in India made a radical break 
with its past. Liberalization and deregulation became the dominant themes. In the discourse 
surrounding that transition, a dominant view has been that an excessively statist economic 
policy was chiefly responsible for India‟s industrialization problems (Bhagwati 1993, Joshi 
and Little 1996, Tendulkar and Bhavani 2007, Virmani 1999).
1
 One of the central elements in 
this assessment of Indian dirigisme is the effect of controls on the competition between firms 
and thereby on the efficiency of the industrial sector. Protectionism and domestic regulation, 
it is argued, protected Indian business firms from both external and internal competition with 
consequences that were often the opposite of what was intended. Specifically, rather than 
curbing monopolies and the concentration of economic power, dirigisme in India allowed a 
segment of private capital to monopolize the opportunities for expansion and to erect artificial 
barriers to the entry of new firms. Established business families, who dominated at the time of 
independence, manipulated the system of controls to maintain their stranglehold on India‟s 
industrial sector.
2
 
                                                     
1
 An earlier critique along the same lines can be found in Bhagwati and Desai 1970. 
2
 The following summarises this viewpoint: “India was the most planned among mixed, non-communist 
economies until 1991. While it had a long tradition of modem private industry run by an indigenous class of 
entrepreneurs, upon independence the consensus was for a state-led, import substitution industrialization with 
relative neglect of agriculture and of the imperatives of employment generation. This was labeled a permit-
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Critics of India‟s statist economic policy have however not been the only subscribers to the 
idea that the system of industrial controls was used by leading business firms to perpetuate 
their dominance. Termed the Hazari-Dutt perspective (Chandrasekhar 1999), this view in fact 
originally emerged out of the Indian discussions on the issue of “concentration of economic 
power” in the 1960s.3 The backdrop to this was the evidence that a few large business houses 
had actually succeeded in maintaining a steady dominance over the industrial sector in the 
first decade and a half of planning. The discussions of the 1960s served however to 
rationalize more rather than less state regulation. Measures like the Monopolies and 
Restrictive Trade Practices (MRTP) Act, the abolition of the Managing Agency System, and 
nationalization of major banks and industries followed. Subsequent assessments revealed that 
most large firms were able to, or allowed to, circumvent these attempts to curb their power 
(Goyal 1979, Paranjape 1991).  
Thus, despite some disagreement about the importance of state intervention for economic 
development, most assessments of India‟s import-substituting industrialization regime have 
fostered the impression that stability characterized the composition of Indian big business 
before liberalization.
4
 However, this issue has never been subjected to systematic 
examination. Nor has there been any attempt to collect evidence that could be used to assess 
how stable the Indian corporate world was during the relevant period. 
This paper puts together evidence to tackle this question. A specially constructed list of 
India‟s largest business enterprises in 1990 is compared with those available from earlier 
studies. This reveals that the process of industrialization between independence and the onset 
of liberalization was accompanied by some continuity as well as important shifts in the 
composition of Indian big business. Despite the ongoing dominance of the oldest and largest 
family firms, entry and exit from the large business sector did take place. There was also a 
significant reordering of relative positions. 
To explain this combination of continuity and change the paper revisits the understanding of 
how business rivalry under dirigisme worked. This is done by placing it within the context of 
dynamic industrialization and structural change. This context was furthermore structured by 
the specific economic, social and political realities of India. As a result, both established 
                                                                                                                                                                     
license raj in which quotas and high tariffs insulated domestic industry from out- side competition, in which a 
large public sector crowded out private companies, and where the few large established business houses grabbed 
most of the licenses issued for capacity expansion in industry”. (Desai 2003) 
3
Hazari (1966, 1967), Government of India (GOI) (1964, 1965, 1967, 1969, )  and Ghose (1972, 1974 a,b, c).  
4
 Baru (1988), Chandrasekhar (1999), and Damodaran (2008) are partially important exceptions. 
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business enterprises and newer or smaller enterprises could all use the methods offered by the 
system of controls to their advantage. Dominance was the consequence of the successful use 
of these rather than their essential premise. The relative abilities of enterprises to exploit 
these methods were determined by a complex set of factors; these were not a simple function 
of their relative sizes. 
The results of this paper indicate that the study of India‟s experience with import-substituting 
industrialization is a field of enquiry that is by no means exhausted. In particular, the 
interface between industrialization and the business histories of that period are open to new 
research and interpretation. Business history has always been a relatively neglected area in 
the research on India (Tripathi 1992). In addition, the study of Indian economic history 
between independence and liberalization is today a major concern of neither of the two 
relevant disciplines, namely history and economics. Indian historiography has traditionally 
not extended itself beyond 1947 (Chibber 2004, Guha 2008). Indian economic research on 
the other hand has always had a contemporary focus, which now translates into an almost 
exclusive preoccupation with the post-liberalization period. The business history of the 
interim period in such a context is even less likely to attract attention if it is assumed that 
there is effectively no such „history‟. To that extent even a simple demonstration that the 
story of the corporate world in that period was one of motion rather than stability is valuable. 
Continuity with Change in India’s Leading Business Firms: The Evidence 
The prevalence of business groups has always rendered difficult the identification and 
ranking according to size of private business firms in India. In the group form of the business 
firm, a number of legally independent companies are subject to the control of a single 
centralized authority and function as a single organization. Information about the companies 
constituting different groups has however never been readily available. This problem was 
even more acute during the period of controls when groups had many reasons for not 
revealing all the companies that they controlled. 
Systematic exercises to identify the companies constituting different groups were undertaken 
only in the 1960s, by Hazari (1966), the Monopolies Inquiry Commission (MIC) (GOI 1965), 
and the Industrial Licensing Policy Inquiry Committee (ILPIC) (GOI 1969). Despite 
differences in the criteria used for determining the company compositions of groups, their 
findings overlapped to a fair degree. However, unlike the MIC, Hazari and ILPIC had two 
different boundaries for individual groups. Hazari‟s „complex‟ for any group included both 
4 
 
an inner-circle and an outer-circle, the latter including those companies where the group 
shared control with some other firm. The ILPIC introduced the concept of a „second-tier‟, in 
which were included companies not part of the group proper but nevertheless having a close 
association with it. Hazari had also highlighted the existence in some cases of sub-groups, 
formally de-linked from the group proper but not operating entirely autonomously.  
Hazari only identified the company composition, in the years 1951 and 1958, of twenty 
groups. The MIC and ILPIC reports, on the other hand, reveal more comprehensive listings 
of firms which had assets of at least Rs. 5 crores (Rs. 50 million) in 1964 and 1966 
respectively. The MIC identified 75 groups and 57 individual companies (companies not 
included in any group, termed as „large independent companies‟ by the ILPIC) meeting that 
criterion in 1964. The comparable numbers from the ILPIC were 72 groups and 60 individual 
companies. Thus from these reports we can generate a list of the 132 largest business firms in 
the mid-1960s. To these one may add three additional groups which were above the threshold 
size in the mid-1960s but escaped the attention of the MIC and the ILPIC. Two additional 
lists can be extracted from the MIC report. The first is of 300 companies which were not 
affiliated with any large group and had assets between Rupees 10 and 50 million in 1964. The 
second is of companies which were amongst the top 5 producing firms of either one of 1278 
different industrial products, amongst whom were many which had assets less than Rupees 10 
million and were also not part of any group.  
Thus, the MIC and the ILPIC reports between them provide a fairly comprehensive picture of 
the leading business firms in India during the early post-independence period. No comparable 
picture for subsequent periods is however available in any published source.
5
 Only the lists of 
companies registered under the MRTP Act, along with their group affiliations, are available 
up to 1990. Unfortunately, all the companies of large groups were not actually registered 
under the Act; nor was the determination of their group affiliation always accurate (Chalapati 
Rao 1985). To arrive at definitive conclusions about what happened to the composition of 
India‟s leading private business firms after the 1960s, a list of the 210 largest firms in 1990, 
virtually the end-point of the dirigiste regime, has therefore been specially constructed.
6
  
                                                     
5
 The major studies are summarized in Sandesara (1992). 
6 Financial data for these companies were taken from GOI (1991 and 1992) and for companies listed on from 
the official directories of stock exchanges. The formidable difficulties faced in preparing such a list prevent 
repeating that exercise for different intermediate points of time between the mid-1960s and then 1990. 
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Information culled from a variety of sources was used to identify 210 large firms that in 1990 
had either assets or income of at least Rupees 100 crores (1000 million).
7
 This threshold size 
could be considered comparable to that used by the MIC and ILPIC for the mid-1960s, given 
the increase in India‟s gross domestic product (GDP) between the 1960s and 1990. The MIC 
data revealed that the value of the annual turnover of large groups in 1964 was similar to the 
value of their assets. Therefore a threshold size defined either in terms of income or assets is 
usable. Where possible both criteria have been used.  
By the author‟s calculations, the 210 large private sector business firms in 1990 accounted for 
roughly 57 per cent of the total assets of over 200,000 private sector companies existing in 
that year and about 72 per cent of their income
8
. 173 of these were Indian firms, 169 of which 
were family controlled. 31 groups/companies were affiliated with foreign multinationals 
(MNCs), four were controlled by non-resident Indians (NRIs) and two were jointly controlled 
by NRI-MNC combinations. It must be noted, however, that any divisions that may have 
affected the family controlled groups have mostly been ignored. This practice was adopted to 
avoid exaggerating any changes in the composition of the leading firms. It does not make 
sense to equate instability within families with instability in the composition of leading firms. 
However, the divisions the ILPIC and the MIC had taken into account have been retained, 
and the second-tier groups of the ILPIC and the Hazari sub-groups are assumed to be distinct 
firms.  
To facilitate comparisons with the mid-1960s picture, the 210 large private firms identified 
for 1990 can be classified into the following categories.   
A)  Those which were amongst the 135 large firms of the mid-1960s.  
B)  Firms indirectly included in the Hazari, MIC or ILPIC lists by virtue of their 
association with large groups – a) as sub-groups/second-tier groups; b) because they jointly 
controlled some companies with major groups; or c) because at least one of their companies 
was managed by a large group through its managing agency.  
C)  Firms having companies with assets between Rs. 1 to 5 crores in 1964 which were not 
listed as large groups at the time.  
D)  Firms which were amongst the top 5 firms in at least one industry in the mid-sixties 
but did not qualify for category C.  
E)  All other firms. 
                                                     
7
 This was the asset limit for registration under MRTP Act applicable in 1990. 
8
 The total assets or income of all companies is not available from any source and these therefore were estimated 
using the aggregates for a sample of companies. 
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Table 1 Shows the distribution of these 210 firms, and different indicators of their size, 
between the five categories. The table also shows the distribution of firms within each 
category by their period of origin. The period of origin in each case, with some adjustments, 
is derived from the earliest year in which a company currently or previously part of the firm 
was incorporated.  
A marked feature of India‟s largest firms in 1990 was that many had come into being before 
the planning era began in 1950. However, such firms were present in all categories including 
category E. The strong component of continuity amongst India‟s leading business firms is 
actually indicated by the large share of Category A firms in the size aggregates for all large 
firms. Category B may also be considered as representing the older, traditional group of large 
firms. However, between them these two categories accounted for less than half of the large 
firms in 1990. Moreover, missing from amongst them were as many as 49 firms that had been 
amongst the largest firms in the mid-1960s. 29 of these were groups and 20 were large 
independent companies. 
Categories C and D include firms that were semi-dominant firms in the 1960s but not in the 
top rung, and whose status had been clearly elevated by the end of the 1980s. The last 
category, accounting for over a third of the largest firms but a much smaller share of the size 
aggregates, could be considered as firms which mainly grew after the mid-1960s. Certainly 
their membership of the group of large firms was a product of the post-independence 
industrialization process. Of the 71 such firms, as many as 65 were Indian controlled. 
To check that the element of change has not been exaggerated by pitching the threshold size 
for 1990 at a low level we doubled the threshold size to Rs. 200 crores. As a result, the total 
number of large firms in 1990 was reduced to 134, almost identical to the number in the mid-
1960s. However, while this reduces the number of category E firms by 32, category A firms 
were also significantly reduced, by 21 to be precise. This means that 70 of the top 134 firms 
in 1990 were different than the top 135 firms of the mid-1960s, and 39 of these were from 
category E.  
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Table 1: Distribution of 210 Large Firms and Size Aggregates by Category, 1990 
Year of 
Origin 
Number 
of 
Firms 
Number of 
Companies 
Percentage Share in Aggregates for 210 Firms 
Paid-Up 
Capital 
Assets Net Fixed 
Assets 
Income/ 
Turover 
Category A 
Up to 1950 79 2739 (2262) 63.34 66.94 65.96 70.18 
1951-65 5 14 (14) 1.79 1.44 1.37 1.85 
Date NA 1 4 (4) 0.04 0.14 0.04 0.19 
TOTAL 85 2757 (2280) 65.18 68.51 67.37 72.21 
Category B 
Up to 1950 11 149 (129) 2.05 2.06 2.15 2.26 
1951-65 4 40 (39) 1.13 1.01 0.94 1.23 
TOTAL 15 209 (188) 3.19 3.06 3.09 3.49 
Category C 
Up to 1950 21 187 (167) 3.09 2.99 2.77 3.87 
1951-65 5 16 (16) 0.96 0.66 0.79 0.86 
TOTAL 26 203 (183) 4.05 3.65 3.55 4.72 
Category D 
Up to 1950 7 161 (135) 3.54 2.86 2.76 2.91 
1951-65 6 61 (57) 1.25 1.13 0.74 1.70 
TOTAL 13 222 (192) 4.79 3.99 3.50 4.61 
Category E 
Up to 1950 21 225 (185) 4.12 4.88 3.53 3.49 
1951-65 16 224 (178) 5.04 3.79 3.99 3.36 
1966-80 28 399 (312) 10.66 9.88 11.74 6.58 
1981-90 4 12 (12) 2.84 2.00 2.97 1.00 
Date N.A. 2 2 (2) 0.13 0.24 0.26 0.54 
TOTAL 71 862 (692) 22.80 20.79 22.49 14.96 
All Categories 
Up to 1950 139 3458 (2878) 76.14 79.72 77.17 82.71 
1951-65 36 355 (304) 10.18 8.02 7.83 8.99 
1966-80 28 399 (312) 10.66 9.88 11.74 6.58 
1981-90 4 12 (12) 2.84 2.00 2.97 1.00 
Date N.A. 3 6 (6) 0.18 0.38 0.29 0.73 
TOTAL 210 4230 (3512) 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 
Note: Figures in parentheses refer to the number of companies whose financial details were available. 
Source: Author‟s calculations based on financial data from sources mentioned in note 9. 
 
 
The essence of continuity and change in the composition of the leading private business firms 
between the mid-1960s and the end of the 1980s can be captured by comparing the 
compositions of the smaller group of firms that stood tall within them at both points of time. 
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In 1990, 42 firms had incomes or assets exceeding Rs. 500 crores, or five times the threshold 
size. Exactly the same number had assets greater than Rs. 25 crores in 1966, which was five 
times the threshold size used by the MIC and the ILPIC
9
. The continuing dominance of old 
firms was reflected in the fact that 35 of the 42 largest firms in 1990 were from category A. 
However, 18 firms amongst the largest 42 in 1966 were not amongst these 35. Only 10 
survived among the set of large firms in 1990, but all of them had slipped down the relative 
size ladder. On the other hand, 11 of the new firms amongst the top 42 in 1990 were from 
category A, old large firms who had enhanced their relative size.  Another firm was from 
category D, dominant in an industry in the mid-1960s but as a small firm. The real break 
from the past lay in the other 6 new firms who were from category E; five of them originated 
after 1965. 
The visibility of a combination of continuity and change even with such significant 
adjustments of the threshold size indicates the tremendous variations amongst firms in both 
categories A and E. Too much should therefore not be made of the fact that the share in the 
size aggregates of category A was considerably greater than that of category B, despite the 
numbers of firms in each being similar. This simply reflects the larger number of category A 
firms in the largest size class, including the two largest groups whose sizes had always been 
significantly larger than of all others (this was true even in the mid-1960s). Other than these 
two, the spectrum of sizes of individual firms in Categories A and E were quite similar. The 
49 firms absent from the large category in 1990, including those that slid down the ladder, 
were spread across the size spectrum in the mid-1960s. Moreover, if one were to go beyond 
simply relative sizes of firms and look at the trajectories which different firms were 
traversing, the extent of decline of some of the old and the rise of some of the new would 
appear more pronounced than it has been possible to show here. Some of the most prominent 
Indian firms of today do not belong to the older group of large firms and were only a little 
above or even just below the threshold size level in 1990. 
Some of the 49 large firms of the 1960s absent from the same category in 1990 still existed as 
private firms but were now below the threshold size. In many instances however, their 
absence from the 1990 list is attributable to the re-distribution of control over capital within 
older firms, or between the State and private capital, that took place between the mid-1960s 
                                                     
9
 The actual number was 43 including the ACC group, treated as an independent group by the MIC and the 
ILPIC the Tatas shared control over ACC with three other groups, but taken by us to be part of the Tata group in 
1966 as well as 1990. 
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and 1990. Their disappearance from the 1990 list of large firms was thus partly a result of 
processes that in fact contributed to reinforcing the dominance of older large firms. The 
newer large firms were not part of that process.  Therefore the interesting point about the 
growth of many new large firms is that the growth happened despite the continuing 
dominance of older large firms. In other words, the demise or decline of segments of older 
large firms that had dominated at the time of independence, the robust survival and growth of 
many others within the same category, and the rise of a number of new large firms 
accompanied the industrialization process after independence. It was this mosaic 
combination, reflected most by the varied fates of family controlled Indian firms, rather than 
a simple reproduction of a stable pattern of dominance that was produced by the competitive 
dynamics of Indian dirigisme.  
Dirigisme and the Competitive Dynamics of Indian Capitalism 
State intervention in the economy in the pre-liberalization era meant that the discretionary 
decisions of state and state controlled agencies and institutions played a crucial role in the 
allocation of expansion opportunities between private capitalist firms. Under the 1951 
Industries Development and Regulation Act, private firms were required to secure licenses 
from the government for new capacity creation or substantially expanding existing capacity.  
In some cases additional approvals were necessary. Foreign collaboration and imports of inputs 
and capital goods also required prior government approval. The state was also omnipresent in 
the financing of private corporate sector. Indian private enterprises relied heavily on external 
institutional finance, and with the nationalization of insurance and banking and the creation 
of state-sponsored industrial development banks and institutions, public sector financial 
institutions became the main suppliers of finance (Reserve Bank of India 2000a and 2000b). 
State institutions also subscribed to and underwrote capital issues by private companies. Even 
the size, form and pricing dimensions of these issues were subject to government control 
under the 1947 Capital Issues (Control) Act, which was repealed only in 1992. The 
significant public sector presence in the Indian economy, and the promotion of a „joint-
sector‟ (public-private partnerships) created a large field of interaction between the public 
sector and private firms. For instance, government agencies and public enterprises granted 
contracts to private firms and also supplied critical inputs to them at administered prices.  
Thus, irrespective of the mechanisms and motivations behind the decision-making of public 
agencies, the benefit of a favourable configuration of such decisions was one of the necessary 
conditions for the business success of individual enterprises. These decisions influenced not 
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only the boundaries of what these firms could do themselves but also what their potential or 
actual competitors could do.  
In the conventional view of competition under Indian dirigisme, the source of large business 
dominance lay in the decisive advantage enjoyed by them in practicing pre-emptive 
behaviour. It has been argued that the environment of controls, especially industrial licensing, 
induced firms to strive to maximise their share in planned investment approvals. This served 
the twin objectives of pre-empting rival firms and of reserving target-bounded investment 
opportunities for themselves. By cornering a large share of these approvals in any industry, a 
firm could prevent entry of competitors even if it did not actually create all the capacity 
licensed to it. The command over large resources and better information and organization of 
large business-houses, it was believed, enabled them to make better use of these possibilities. 
They could influence the decision-making process in their favour and shut out potential 
competition from smaller firms (Bhagwati and Desai 1970, Ghose 1974a, GOI 1965). The 
multi-company business group structure also helped large firms to use many different 
companies to secure multiple industrial licenses in the same industry.  
One basis for the disproportionate influence of large business firms, according to the MIC, 
was their “deep pockets”, which could be used to provide financial assistance to political 
parties and corrupt officials (GOI 1965, p. 136). The perception that the control regime 
spawned a system of corruption has become quite common. It is widely acknowledged that 
this became more dominant in the second half of the control regime, after circa 1970 (Goyal 
1979, Kochanek 1987, Virmani 2004). However, discussions in the 1960s did not reduce the 
issue to corruption and instead emphasized the working of other forces in favour of 
established business firms. These included the perception that they had greater ability to 
secure finances or foreign collaboration. They were also able to build on established 
“credentials” in executing large projects. These, it was felt, influenced the decisions of public 
authorities keen to ensure industrialization and the effective utilization of scarce resources. 
The control and influence of large business houses over banks and financial institutions were 
also highlighted as a factor behind their greater access to finance. The establishment of public 
sector dominance in finance, however, did not necessarily affect the superior access to 
finance of large firms. Moreover, the securing of an industrial license often virtually 
guaranteed the availability of the requisite finance from public sector institutions. 
The traditional view did capture aspects of how the competitive process under Indian 
dirigisme actually operated. The weakness of the view comes from drawing too strong a 
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correlation between firm size, influence, and the reproduction of dominance, ignoring in the 
process the specific Indian context within which the regime of controls operated, as well as 
its dynamic nature. 
The Impact of Industrialization and Structural Change 
The process of industrialization was the backdrop for the actual combination of continuity and 
change amongst large Indian businesses. Industrialization meant not merely an expansion of 
industrial output but also significant diversification of the industrial structure. This structural 
change was more pronounced in the case of the formal or organized segment of Indian 
industry, the segment in which corporate enterprises operated. At independence, India had a 
substantial textile industry as well as food product industries, but other, more modern, 
industries were extremely underdeveloped. Growth over the subsequent four decades 
however came mostly from modern sectors. The overall decline in the relative share of the 
traditional industries was also accompanied by a massive redistribution of textile production 
(fabrics) towards the informal or unorganized sector. 
The structural change accompanying industrialization should be seen as one possible factor 
behind the changes in the composition of large enterprises. Textiles and other traditional 
industries had been important for many of the old large enterprises, being the initial base for 
their growth.
10
 Even in the mid-1960s, nearly 40% of the aggregate turnover of the 75 large 
groups identified by the MIC was derived from these industries. Over 20 groups and 13 of the 
57 large independent companies were mainly based in these industries. By contrast, by the 
end of the 1980s, large enterprises were founded in a wide range of industries and hardly any 
had their major base in textiles. Table 2 gives a sense of this by showing the diversity of 
industries in which large enterprises had large individual turnovers in 1990. 
However, industrialization and structural change by themselves cannot completely explain 
the change in the composition of large enterprises. For one, had there been such a simple 
relationship between the two, the changes in composition should have been far greater than 
observed. The element of continuity in the membership of the set of large enterprises is 
simply too great for this explanation to be entirely satisfactory. How then does one explain 
this degree of continuity, an equally important part of the story? Moreover, the industrial 
spread of the turnover of older and newer large enterprises in 1990 were not radically 
different.  
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 Britain in the early 20
th
 century is a good example (Hannah 1983). 
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Table 2: Selected List of Indian Industries where Large Enterprises had Individual 
Turnovers Exceeding Rs. 50 Crores (500 million), 1990 
Industry Number of Large Enterprises With Turnover in Range : 
>1000 500-1000 200-500 100-200 50-100 Total 50+ 
Textiles  1 7 5 11 24 
Sugar    5 3 8 
Vanaspati, etc.   2 4 2 8 
Tea and Coffee  1 2 1 3 7 
Jute Goods     2 2 
Other Food Products   1 3 5 9 
Cement 1 1 1 8 6 17 
Paper and Pulp   3 1 3 7 
Chemicals 4 6 14 12 25 61 
Automobiles and Tyres 2 4 12 5 1 24 
Steel and Steel Products 1  2 11 10 24 
Electrical Machinery   4 7 10 21 
Electronics   1 3 8 12 
Non-Electrical Machinery   5 6 7 18 
Plastic & PVC Products    1 4 5 
Alcohol & Tobacco 
Products 
1  2 4  7 
Other Products  1 2 6 18 27 
Source: Derived from CMIE, Market Shares 1991. 
 
Evidence at a more disaggregated level for Indian controlled large enterprises also confirms 
that the change in the composition of large enterprises was not a simple process. Old 
enterprises did not always remain ensconced in the declining traditional industries and the 
growth of new enterprises did not always reflect the growing significance of newer industries. 
No doubt some of the large enterprises of the 1960s that ceased to be so by 1990, like the 
Podar, Mangaldas Parekh, B Kanoria and Rohit groups, were primarily textile industry 
oriented. So too were some others that experienced relative decline in their position between 
the mid-1960s and 1990, like Soorajmull Nagarmull, Thackersey, Ruia, and Thiagaraja. 
However, there were also many exceptions to this trend amongst enterprises that initially 
established themselves through the textile industries. Those like Birla, Kasturbhai Lalbhai, JK 
Singhania, Mafatlal, and Goenka, successfully survived the process of industrial change by 
finding opportunities of expansion outside the traditional industries. Further, some of the 
older large enterprises that declined had not focused on the sunset industries in the 1960s, but 
on those industries that grew relatively rapidly after independence. These included groups 
like Sahu Jain (Cement) and S.P. Jain (Chemicals and Footwear) which experienced relative 
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decline, and others who had slipped below the threshold size level like RK Dalmia (Edible 
Oils and Cement), Indra Singh (Engineering), Kamani (Electrical Goods and Non-Ferrous 
metals), and Muthiah (Chemicals). Some like Sarabhai had substantial presence in both 
textiles and chemicals in the mid-1960s yet experienced significant decline in their relative 
position. Even more striking is the fact that new large enterprises emerged from not only the 
new industries but also many traditional industries. New large groups like Reliance, Oswal, 
Garden Silk, Siyaram Poddar and LNJ Bhilwara drew substantial turnovers from textiles in 
1990. Edible oils, which was important, apart from Oswal, for other new groups like Amrit 
Banaspati and Wipro followed a similar pattern. The largest turnover of any single group in 
the sugar industry in 1990 (Rs. 145 crores) was that of a new group, the Sakthi group. 
Industrial transformation possibly produced the varied trajectories of individual firm in two 
ways. Firstly, expansion opportunities were mainly outside the traditional industries, forcing 
the older group of large enterprises to transform in order to sustain their dominant position. It is 
unlikely, however that all would automatically take the steps required for such a transformation 
at the appropriate time. Secondly, large enterprises did not make their investment decisions as a 
group, but individually. Consequently even if they could collectively have cornered all 
expansion opportunities of long-run significance in new industries, there was no mechanism to 
ensuring that they would do so. They therefore often missed out on expansion opportunities that 
could be exploited by smaller or newer enterprises. Both these possibilities are made even more 
likely by two facts. First, many of the new industries were far removed from the traditional 
industries in which many large enterprises were initially based. Second, the scale of expansion 
opportunities they offered in their initial stages was often quite small. This could have made 
older large enterprises pass over some expansion opportunities. The absence of dominant 
incumbent firms and smaller initial investments would have made these opportunities attractive 
to newer or smaller enterprises. Thus, within the context of industrial transformation, the 
decline of large enterprises and the rise of new ones, or a change in their relative positions, 
could eventually result from the different strategic choices by firms, sometimes induced by 
different initial relative positions. 
This kind of process definitely did happen in India, particularly in the initial period of post-
independence industrialization. Until the mid-1960s, there was an important difference in the 
strategy choices made by the survivors and those who declined.  Survivors pursued industrial 
expansion during the first three five-year plans and diversified into new industries, while the 
firms that declined chose to remain concentrated in the traditional industries. This failure to 
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diversify was to be of decisive significance as the industrial sector entered into a period of 
protracted crisis after the mid-1960s, which most severely affected the textile industry. The 
decisions of many enterprises in categories C to E to enter into smaller industries before the 
mid-1960s proved to be equally decisive, but in the opposite direction. Some of these 
enterprises had achieved turnovers in excess of Rs. 100 crores by 1990. Examples of this are 
Eicher (Tractors), Amrit Banaspati and Wipro (Vanaspati), Atlas Cycles and Hero Cycles 
(Bicycles), Kelvinator (Refrigerators), Facor (Ferro Manganese) and HN Kapadia (Tin 
Containers). 
Early entry into an industry was however not necessarily a decisive advantage. This was 
proved by the growth of new enterprises in industries that had been dominated initially by 
older large enterprises. In 1990, three Category E enterprises (Raasi, Jaiprakash, and Gujarat 
Ambuja) and a Category C enterprise (Ramco) all had turnovers in excess of Rs. 100 crores 
in the cement industry, more than that of the Sahu Jain group which had been amongst the 
dominant groups in that sector in the mid-1960s. Another prominent example is of the 
Reliance group, the most important representative of the newer large enterprises in 1990. 
Reliance‟s dominant position in the polyester fibre and some polyester intermediates 
industries, where many older large enterprises were the initially important players, was built 
up in less than a decade before 1990. These kinds of instances cannot be explained by 
industrial change alone. Comprehending them requires a modification and reconstruction of 
the conventional view on the competitive context under dirigisme. 
The State and Inter-Firm Rivalry under Dirigisme: A Revised View  
The rivalry between different private business enterprises characteristic of India under 
dirigisme had a distinctive character. Much of the rivalry was not played out in the market, 
but in shaping the conditions of market rivalry, which sometimes made competition appear to 
be virtually absent. The means of business strength were external to enterprises and securing 
them was in fact the object of the rivalry. In this rivalry, the size of an enterprise did not in 
fact provide such a decisive advantage. At the same time, it also meant that the dominant 
positions of firms were not closely tied to a particular industrial context. 
In a context where business enterprises are reliant mainly on internal sources of funds, the 
investment possibilities of different firms are determined by the magnitude of funds owned 
by them. Large sized firms in such a situation could be expected to corner a large share of 
expansion opportunities because of their greater financial resources. Even in a situation of 
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where external finance is available, the allocation of such funds between enterprises would 
tend to favour large firms if commercially oriented industrial financing institutions or return-
seeking individual investors dominated the process. However, in India the public sector 
financial institutions which mainly provided finance did not operate on a pure commercial 
basis. Their financing decisions were often subject to extraneous influences and were not 
always based on independent appraisal of projects and borrowers.  
Large size could also be considered a major advantage if technology is proprietary in nature 
and mostly developed internally by the firms using them.  Such was however not the case in 
India under dirigisme. Like all late industrializations of the second half of the twentieth 
century, Indian industrialization was initially heavily dependent on technology acquisition 
from abroad. Creating an independent technological base and preventing unnecessary 
duplication of technology imports were certainly the stated objectives behind the regulation 
of technology imports. By and large, however, the policy failed in its objective to promote the 
development of technology by Indian industry (Alam 1985, Tyabji 2000). In most industries 
Indian private enterprises typically did not create their own technology, for entry into a new 
industry or for upgrading in an existing one; they secured it through foreign collaboration. 
The competition to secure technology through such collaborations was somewhat different 
from that for finance. This is because the foreign suppliers of technology were not necessarily 
amenable to the same influences as the public sector industrial financing institutions. Since 
foreign collaboration and its terms were subject to governmental approval, the ability to 
secure technology depended not only on how much a firm was willing to pay or do for it but 
also on what it was permitted to pay and do. Moreover, there is no reason to presume that, 
other things being equal, foreign firms would always have preferred collaboration with 
established large Indian firms.  
Large size did not represent an overwhelming and mutually reinforcing advantage in the 
competition for finance and technology. This was also the case in what was perhaps the most 
important rivalry between firms. This was the rivalry for approvals from state agencies, 
success in which was also critical for securing and successfully using finance and technology. 
In any economic context where the presence of a set of large and dominant enterprises is a 
structural feature, it would be inevitable that such enterprises would enjoy a significant 
influence with the state.  The Indian situation under dirigisme was no exception on this count. 
However, since size and status itself depended crucially on the command over influence and 
had a relatively fragile independent basis, the leverage enjoyed by large enterprises in India 
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with the state had a correspondingly weaker structural foundation. This is all the more so 
when one is referring to the leverage relevant for advancing the individual interests of these 
enterprises rather than their ability to promote their general interest in relation to other 
sections of society.  
The contestation over approvals was wider and more incessant than presumed by the 
traditional view. The fundamental assumption that licensing of capacity was limited by plan 
targets was neither consistent with planners being serious about plan targets nor with the 
notion that the ability of any enterprise to secure industrial licenses depended on its „influence‟ 
and „connections‟. In the former situation, pre-emptive behaviour of enterprises and under-
utilization of licenses would have induced a tendency towards over-licensing as a 
countervailing measure (Chandrasekhar 1999). The ILPIC had noted that a strict relationship 
between targets and approvals did not exist even in the early post-independence period and 
rejection of licenses beyond planned targets was due more to factors like foreign exchange 
shortages. On the other hand, the exhaustion of a plan target would not necessarily stand in the 
way of getting additional capacity licensed if the influence commanded by the enterprise 
seeking it mattered significantly.  
In reality the state in India at no stage displayed the capacity to discipline private capital in the 
manner that was necessary if plan targets for investment were to be strictly enforced (Chibber 
2004). This inability had other implications too. The actual capacities created could deviate 
from licensed capacities in either direction. If there was underutilization of licenses, firms also 
created capacities larger than what was approved. These additional capacities either remained 
undeclared or approvals for them were secured ex post. The ILPIC had in fact found that the 
phenomenon of enterprises installing capacities beyond their licensed levels was more common 
than preemption through cornering of licenses which were then not subsequently implemented.  
A later study had also found the co-existence of under-utilization and over-utilization of 
licenses and of actual production levels both significantly below as well as above stated 
installed capacity levels (Corporate Studies Group 1983a and 1983b). This does not mean that 
the success of enterprises in securing approvals for themselves and restricting those granted to 
competitors was irrelevant. It was not for instance possible to create any capacity in an industry 
unless at least some was licensed. The extent to which licensing and other regulations could be 
stretched by enterprises was also subject to some limits. There were costs associated with such 
stretching, which would be expected to increase more than proportionately with its degree. 
However, to the extent that there could be such stretching in addition to the weak link between 
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plan targets and licensed capacity, pre-emption of licenses and reservation of capacity were less 
effective as a means of maintaining dominance than the traditional view thought to be the case. 
The rivalry between firms operating under a regime of controls in India for finance, technology, 
and approvals was thus different from the conventional market rivalry. It was not so much a 
battle where competitive strengths depended on proprietary resources existing within firms, 
which could then be leveraged also in the competition for securing complementary resources 
from outside.  Instead business success depended more on being able to command resources 
existing mainly outside the firm and influencing market conditions through means not under 
the direct control of firms. In such a rivalry, the access of any enterprise to finance, technology 
and the other means of business success depended not directly on its relative size but on the 
patronage it could command from state agencies. The benefit of such patronage and the 
consequent access to other means was not a one-time but rather a recurring requirement. 
Precisely however because large enterprises were deficient in firm-specific strengths, they were 
relatively more easily replaceable as the beneficiaries of patronage. Reproduction of the 
dominant position of any enterprise did not therefore have a very secure foundation. 
Conversely, if it could enjoy such patronage at critical points in its history a smaller firm could 
be transformed into a large and dominant one. This was the key which could open many doors. 
The insecure basis for dominance should not of course be exaggerated. Investing effort and 
resources towards the objective of securing and maintaining influence was an integral 
element of large enterprises‟ business strategy. This strategy no doubt paid some dividends, 
though factors other than simply corruption constituted the basis for the command over 
influence. Shifts in business leadership could, however, accompany industrialization even 
when large and dominant enterprises typically enjoyed greater leverage with state agencies 
and financial institutions than run of the mill businessmen. Such a prior status was in all 
circumstances neither absolutely critical nor always sufficient for gaining the necessary 
patronage. This would be ruled out only if a set of enterprises enjoyed a complete monopoly 
over all patronage throughout. This scenario is by no means a natural corollary of dirigisme. 
It requires a very definite historical, social, and political context to prevail. The Indian 
context at no stage after independence, let alone throughout the four decades of dirigisme, 
was of that kind.  
The state in India had to manage a vast country with an extremely complex society, 
characterized by the co-existence of a variety of social and economic groups and great 
linguistic, religious and cultural diversity. The industrial capitalist class at independence was 
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only one such group, which was also narrow in other senses. It was very small in number and 
presided over only a small part of the society‟s entire production activity. Its constituents were 
also drawn from very few of India‟s social and linguistic groups. Politicians and bureaucrats 
however did not come from a small closed circle associated with these dominant business 
families. Since the adoption of its constitution soon after independence, India has also had a 
reasonably stable formal state structure. The key elements of this structure have been a federal 
system of government with cabinets and elected legislatures at the central and state level, a 
professional bureaucracy and an independent judiciary. The states were also soon after 
independence reorganized on a linguistic basis.  
However stretchable, discretionary decision-making in such a setting was always subject to 
some boundaries, whether legal, political, or sometimes arising from even the rivalry between 
enterprises. There were also limits to the centralization of the decision-making process. For 
one, decisions of multiple agencies not necessarily subject to a common authority (for example 
the central and state governments) could often be relevant for business enterprises. Every 
decision involved a variety of individuals and actors, directly the participants in the formal 
decision-making process and indirectly those capable of influencing or pressurizing the 
decision-makers. The individuals responsible for decision-making could also change as a 
result of processes that could not be entirely controlled by businessmen. For instance, 
governments and ministers could and did change because of the electoral process. 
Despite widespread corruption, it would be a gross oversimplification to say that every 
decision of every bureaucrat and every politician was taken to favour some particular 
businessmen in exchange for a pay-off. Even if the motivations involved were not always 
entirely selfless, bureaucrats and politicians also responded to a variety of non-pecuniary 
incentives, pulls and pressures. For instance, legislators and state governments often lobbied 
for industrial projects to be located in their own constituencies or states because it suited their 
political ends. The decision taken in the early years after independence to restrict capacity 
expansion in the organized cotton textile mills in order to promote the handloom sector, the 
spate of nationalizations in the late 1960s and 1970s, and the government takeover of a 
number of sick companies up to the early 1980s, can hardly be called the handiwork of 
powerful business interests. Many large enterprises in fact lost valuable assets in that process.  
As indicated earlier, the third largest group in the mid-1960s, Martin Burn, was virtually wiped 
out in one stroke by such takeovers in the 1970s . Large and powerful enterprises also failed 
occasionally to get the approvals they wanted. The Birla group, one amongst the two largest 
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enterprises throughout the period of dirigisme, for example was not able to realize its 
ambitions to set up a steel plant even when it was the biggest beneficiary of the licensing 
regime. 
In other words, the sphere of politics and state decision-making had its autonomous and 
independent dynamics and the leading business enterprises did not possess all the levers for 
controlling it. At the macro level, both private capital and the state were interested in 
promoting a process of industrialization after independence. But the imperatives to which they 
responded were not identical. At the micro level, individual business enterprises pursued their 
own competing interests while individuals and groups involved in public decision-making 
acted in response to a variety of motivations. As individual business enterprises jostled 
amongst themselves to gain influence over the decision-making of the state, they could and 
did use multiple channels. Personal, family or political relations, or regional and community 
affiliations, were always relevant along with plain bribery to getting favourable decisions. 
Even the quid pro quo for getting the necessary approvals need not always have been a 
simple bribe. The location of the concerned industrial project, where it would suit the 
interests of powerful individuals or entities, could for instance also serve a similar function. 
The ability to use these kinds of channels of influence was not in all cases dependent on 
having a prior large size. It was always possible that a particular small enterprise could have 
access to a channel not available to a rival large one. Even the ability to pay bribes was not 
strictly a function of size. Thus there were opportunities for some newer or smaller 
enterprises to benefit from state patronage, and at times at the expense of a large and 
dominant rival.    
A particularly prominent trend was the role that state governments played in the growth of 
new large enterprises. There are several category E large enterprises in whose fortunes State 
Governments or their sponsored financial institutions had a decisive impact. The most 
important company in 1990 of the Raunaq Singh group, Apollo Tyres, was established in the 
1970s under the joint sponsorship of the State government in the rubber-growing southern 
Indian state of Kerala. In another southern state, Andhra Pradesh, the Andhra Pradesh 
Industrial Development Corporation jointly promoted the first major ventures of the 
Nagarjuna, Raasi, Priyadarshini and Nava Bharat groups in the 1970s. The Punjab State 
Industrial Development Corporation similarly aided the Steel Strips group to establish itself. 
Gujarat Ambuja Cements started off as a joint-sector enterprise with the Gujarat Industrial 
Investment Corporation. There are similar instances amongst category A enterprises that 
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experienced an improvement in relative positions.
11
 Support from State governments in these 
cases went beyond the financial. It also considerably strengthened the ability of enterprises to 
secure the necessary approvals. 
The context of inter-firm rivalry and discretionary decision-making in India was never 
characterized by the exclusive control of a set of established large enterprises. This context 
also was not a static but dynamic one. As the industrialization process unfolded and 
transformed the context, the control regime too was amended from time to time. The degree 
to which the regime favoured older, established enterprises, and the ways in which it did so, 
were consequently not the same throughout the period of dirigisme.  
ILPIC observed the influence of large enterprises‟ “credentials” on licensing decisions in 
certain sectors. However, this may have had a lot to do with the specific context prevailing in 
the initial stages of the post-independence industrialization process. In this phase, the state 
was keen to promote the growth of domestic capital goods industries and to widen the 
industrial structure. However, given the initial limited development of these industries, policy 
towards foreign investment and collaboration was also relatively more permissive than it was to 
become after the mid-1960s. In addition, while a significant part of this development was to be 
in the public sector, to begin with there was hardly any public sector and a very limited and 
inexperienced machinery for planning and state management of the economy. The 
development of state sponsored industrial financing institutions was also in its nascent stages. 
These circumstances would have created a selection bias in favour of large established 
enterprises in some key sectors involving large projects. Where the same considerations did 
not apply, as in the cotton textile industry in which import-substitution had been completed 
before independence, the state acted differently despite a significant big business presence. 
Licenses were also issued to many newer or smaller enterprises in a number of less 
significant industries. 
During the decade of industrial stagnation that followed the mid-1960s crisis, economic 
policy was less coherent than before. There were however certain clear departures from the 
policies of the earlier phase. After a brief interlude of external sector liberalization, in the 
face of foreign exchange difficulties, the state became far more restrictive on the external 
front. In response to the strained economic conditions as well as the political turmoil it 
                                                     
11
 The M.A. Chidambaram group, amongst the smallest of the large groups in the mid-1960s,  became a 
reluctant private partner of the Tamil Nadu Industrial Development Corporation in the latter‟s venture, the 
Southern Petrochemical Industries Corporation (SPIC), whichsubsequently became the flagship company of the  
group  
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engendered, the state also nationalized extensively. Public sector dominance of the financial 
sector came to be firmly established in this period. All of these, and other measures like the 
MRTP Act, made for an enlarged role of the state in the economy. This happened along with 
increasing corruptibility of the decision-making process and an erosion of planning which 
was more or less permanent in nature. Public investment growth also slipped on account of 
the fiscal crisis, and this in turn led to attempts in the 1970s to induce private investment by 
loosening controls. This included de-licensing in some industries, easier capacity expansions 
or endorsement of unlicensed capacity, easing of restrictions on investments by large 
enterprises in certain industries, and freer licensing in sectors facing shortages. These were 
accompanied by the reservation of some sectors for small-scale industry.  
The loosening of the licensing regime certainly made entry conditions easier in some industries, 
an important case being that of the shortage afflicted cement industry where many new firms 
entered. The reining in of MNCs during this phase also created space for the growth of new or 
small Indian firms in some industries, the most prominent case being that of pharmaceuticals.  
The balance was also tilted further against older large enterprises in certain sectors by the state 
takeover of their assets. At the same time, the position of some of these older established 
enterprises was reinforced by other components of the policy changes. Endorsement of 
unlicensed capacity and restricted foreign exchange availability made entry conditions in many 
industries with large enterprises as incumbents more stringent. At the same time these 
enterprises benefited from easing of restrictions on their investment in other industries, and 
also from restrictions on MNCs. Overall, however, the period from the mid-1960s to the end 
of the 1970s was one of slow and extremely fragmented growth. This did not produce a 
visibly dramatic shift in favour of newer large enterprises. It did however partially create the 
foundations for some of the changes which were to become possible subsequently. Thus, 
despite stagnation, the number of registered non-government companies increased rapidly 
during this period. This was in contrast to the earlier phase of rapid industrial growth, when 
no such increase took place. 
In the 1980s yet another situation emerged. The earlier emphasis on developing a capital 
goods industry gave way to a process of liberalization of capital goods imports. There was 
also a cautious liberalization of FDI policy and a more or less consistent trend of liberalization 
in licensing policy. The public expenditure driven growth of the market created conditions for 
expansion in several industries, of which both older and newer enterprises took advantage. 
The expanding electronics industry in particular was the route through which a number of new 
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large enterprises emerged. Limited external sector liberalization was critical to this as the 
availability of imported CKD and SKD kits reduced the sunk costs associated with entry, and 
made foreign collaboration easier. At the same time product markets remained protected. 
Groups like Videocon, Onida, and BPL (Televisions), Samtel (TV picture tubes), and HCL and 
Wipro (Computers) emerged as large firms in the electronics sector in the second half of the 
1980s. 
Conclusion 
This article has presented evidence that India‟s post-independence industrialization under 
dirigisme was accompanied by a combination of continuity and change amongst India‟s large 
private business enterprises. This is, on reflection, not surprising. Given the specific 
historico-economic context of Indian industrialization, the sources of business strength were 
external to all enterprises, large and small, and access to them depended on securing the 
patronage of state agencies.  
The dominant position of the older and established large enterprises was not tied strongly to 
the maintenance of an industrial context dominated by the traditional industries in which they 
were initially established. Industrialization made the transformation of older, established, 
enterprises a necessary condition for maintaining their dominant position. That 
transformation, achieved by many amongst them, would have been exceedingly difficult had 
they been dependent on their own resources. If textile based enterprises had to rely mainly on 
the profits from these activities to finance their forays into newer industries, they may never 
have been able to do so and would have perished like the others who chose not to diversify. If 
diversification and entry into new industries relied on the self-development of technology, 
few of the older firms would have been able to do so. Without the helping hand of state 
agencies they may not have been able to set themselves up in industries that were often as 
new to them as they would have been to any other emerging enterprise. However, if the 
external basis of business strength allowed many of the older enterprises to adapt more easily 
to a changing industrial context by becoming its instruments rather than its victims, it was 
also a source of weakness for them. It meant that existing business strength provided only a 
weak basis for success in the rivalry for securing the means of future strength - all the more 
so when the industrial context was changing. The social and political realities of India too did 
not provide a background for dominant business families and public officials to be tied together 
into a close-knit and exclusive network from which others were completely shut out. Thus, 
even though all large enterprises actively sought to maintain their influence with public 
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agencies, there was no inbuilt automatic mechanism to guarantee this. Conversely, the 
external basis of business strength could be used by a smaller or newer enterprise to catapult 
itself into the big league, and opportunities of this kind were thrown up to a greater extent on 
account of the structural changes in the industrial sector. Access to the necessary support for 
this from state agencies did not critically depend on business strength or prior membership of a 
fixed group of favoured businessmen. A variety of channels not dependent on past success 
could be used for that purpose, and these became available in different ways at different stages 
of the industrialization process. 
The competitive context of the process of industrialization as it went through its different stages 
could and did impact on different large business enterprises differently, leading to survival, exit 
and entry. Both the old large enterprises that survived the industrialization process after 
independence, and newer ones that joined their ranks, benefited from the external sources of 
business strength. It enabled the survival of the former and the emergence of the latter. 
Continuity and change amongst leading enterprises therefore had a common underlying basis. 
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